Metaphysics of Mind
I am interested in the puzzle of mental causation: How can mental properties be, on the one hand, different from physical properties and, on the other hand, causally efficacious? I am sympathetic to the view that our folk-psychological notion of causation encompasses two different notions: Counterfactual dependence and a metaphysical 'push' or 'oomph', whatever that is (perhaps energy transfer of some kind?). If this is correct, then it seems worth exploring whether Jaegwon Kim's argument for reductionism might trade on conflating those two notions.
Publications
JOURNAL ARTICLES
(2011) (with Suzanne Bliss) "Does the supervenience argument generalize?", in the Southern Journal of Philosophy.
(2010) (with Suzanne Bliss) "Program Explanation and Higher-Order Properties", in Acta Analytica.
(2008) (with Suzanne Bliss) "Causal Inheritance and Second-Order Properties", in Abstracta.
(2005) (with Tim Bayne) "Resisting Ruthless Reductionism: A commentary on Bickle", in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
BOOK REVIEWS
(2010) (with Suzanne Bliss) "Review of 'Mental Causation' by Anthony Dardis", in Mind.
Publications
JOURNAL ARTICLES
(2011) (with Suzanne Bliss) "Does the supervenience argument generalize?", in the Southern Journal of Philosophy.
(2010) (with Suzanne Bliss) "Program Explanation and Higher-Order Properties", in Acta Analytica.
(2008) (with Suzanne Bliss) "Causal Inheritance and Second-Order Properties", in Abstracta.
(2005) (with Tim Bayne) "Resisting Ruthless Reductionism: A commentary on Bickle", in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
BOOK REVIEWS
(2010) (with Suzanne Bliss) "Review of 'Mental Causation' by Anthony Dardis", in Mind.